To Massad Boulos: You are on the right track Ramadan Mubarak
To Massad Boulos: You are on the right track! — Ramadan Mubarak
Munzer Mustafa
Translated from Arabic
The Sudanese people yearn for an end to the war and the suffering perpetuated by socially and politically isolated groups (the militias: the military and paramilitary forces currently in conflict). These groups seek to hold the land and the people hostage to gain fleeting international recognition, driven by a “scorched earth” strategy: (If you cannot control the land, make it uninhabitable). These militias have found a natural ally in the “Muslim Brotherhood,” which shares their objectives. Experience has shown that these factions revel in manipulating regional diplomatic institutions, which have historically preferred a policy of “containing the heads” rather than a fundamental understanding of the nature of the conflict, its parties, and the limits of their capabilities.
Therefore, a truce—however fragile it may seem at the outset—is an urgent necessity that cannot be delayed under the pretext of incomplete conditions for success. Halting military operations, even if not immediately followed by a total end to the war, is sufficient to embarrass the “Brotherhood” and render their investment in militias futile. It opens the way for political and civil forces to besiege the war option; these forces possess unique experience in taming militias and stripping legitimacy from what the gun imposes. The current regime is no stronger than it was during the era of Omar al-Bashir; it suffers from deep structural fissures, evident in the existence of two competing governments vying for the legacy of the country and the organization.
Furthermore, opening humanitarian corridors puts regional parties—those lacking strategic vision and driven by transient interests—to a true test of their lasting influence. Their interests are tied to individuals and groups based on the assumption of their “influence” and ability to protect those interests. Thus, shifting the focus from “shipping weapons” to “distributing aid” will push them to the sidelines of the equation, leading to fundamental shifts in the intersection of local and regional interests.
Despite the attempts of the “de facto authorities” to consolidate their legitimacy through aid and presenting themselves as providers of essential services, they lack experience and vision, operating from a purely “surveillance-based” (security) mindset that has failed repeatedly. Conversely, the grassroots groups that have stood by local communities since the early days of the war have accumulated an inspiring experience that can be relied upon to protect the population from the whims of warlords.
While these groups are not organically linked to politicians, the nature of the “civil and humanitarian contract” between them and local communities aligns in essence with the “political contract” proposed by civil forces. This is manifest in their shared definition of the war and their commitment to building a state of institutions that prioritizes the people’s aspirations. Any peaceful movement aimed at common goals—starting with relief—necessarily means bridging the current organizational gap, leading to the final chapter of the war and the beginning of a new transition.
The approach based on “localizing the solution” and making it a Sudanese-owned process is an ideal choice. it aligns with the vision of thought leaders who realize that the “final day” of the war must be crafted by the people, ensuring that the “day after” belongs to society. What the “Consultative Mechanism” has reached touches the aspirations of Sudanese to halt external interference, as expressed by the truce as a first step.
The results you have reached through these shuttle consultations will inevitably place you in the face of two contradictory types of criticism:
1| Existential (Negative) Criticism: Primarily from the “Muslim Brotherhood.” This organization views any rapprochement or truce as a direct threat to its political survival. They adopt a strategy of “political nihilism,” willing to see the entire region burn rather than lose their influence. For them, the continuation of the war is a “legal cover” for their existence; any path toward military de-escalation strips them of the blackmail tool they wield against the state and society.
2| Radical (Positive) Criticism: Coming from some leaders of civil and human rights forces. They operate from a legitimate “moral idealism,” seeking radical solutions to end the suffering of the Sudanese in one comprehensive stroke. They fear that a “fragile” or “piecemeal” truce might legitimize the status quo or reproduce the crisis. While their criticism aims to protect the revolution and the state of institutions, the “political possibility” at this moment may not accommodate the full ceiling of their demands at once, causing the criticism of ends to clash with the realism of means.
It is crucial to expedite the imposition of the truce, maintain pressure on the militias, list the “Brotherhood” as a terrorist organization, and expand the “Consultative Mechanism” to include genuine local actors. Some may see these steps as insufficient, but they represent the cornerstone for building “Sustainable Peace and Genuine Partnerships” that will finally lead us toward a state of institutions.
- Mustafa
Researcher | Institute of Public Policy – Sudan
February 18, 2026
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